Long-standing assumptions about the United States’ ability to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan are increasingly being questioned, as shifts in global power and supply chains reshape strategic calculations. The issue goes beyond military strength, touching on economics, logistics and geopolitics, particularly in East Asia. Recent developments suggest that the balance underpinning the post-Cold War, US-led international order may no longer be as stable as once assumed.
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One notable change has emerged far from the Taiwan Strait, in global commodity flows. China has begun receiving iron ore from the vast Simandou deposits in Guinea, a project in which Chinese entities hold significant influence. As production scales up, Simandou could substantially reduce China’s dependence on Australian iron ore. This matters strategically, as Australia’s role as China’s primary supplier has often been viewed as a potential constraint on Beijing’s willingness to pursue military action against Taiwan.
At the same time, military realities in the region have evolved. China’s armed forces have expanded rapidly in size and capability, particularly its navy, air force and missile forces. While the United States still outspends China on defence and retains qualitative advantages, any conflict near Taiwan would see American forces operating far from their bases, while Chinese forces would be close to home. This geographic imbalance could reduce the practical impact of Washington’s spending advantage in a high-intensity conflict.
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Public and classified war games have reflected these challenges. Some assessments suggest that while the United States could ultimately prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, it would do so at immense cost, suffering losses not seen for decades. Such a conflict would leave both powers severely weakened and inflict serious damage on the global economy. The prevailing conclusion among many analysts is that deterrence remains possible, but only if the risks and likelihood of failure for any invasion are made sufficiently clear.
